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Abstract: Although history, legal history, and socio-legal studies significantly overlap 
in concerns, methods, values and history, and a common tradition, these 
commonalities are frequently overlooked. In seeking to promote greater dialogue 
between these disciplines, this article examines their complex interaction, arguing 
that the work of socio-legal scholars, historians, and legal historians would benefit 
from greater cross-fertilization. It focuses on the ‘legal turn’ in recent history writing 
on early modern England, particularly Christopher W. Brooks’s ground-breaking 
analysis of the nature and extent of legal consciousness throughout society, and the 
central role of law and legal institutions in the constitution of society. It then outlines 
some areas of common interest and, having highlighted the increasing convergence 
between history, legal history, and socio-legal studies, concludes that greater 
dialogue would enhance our understanding of the role of law in society, and of 




Socio-legal studies is embedded in a cluster of social practices and relations sustained by 
many disciplines. Within this broad church, history has always been an important strand, 
although the linkages between history and socio-legal studies are complex and paradoxical. 
Socio-legal studies was constituted against the dominant tradition of legal education and 
scholarship, with its focus on the principles of law, and that vein of legal history preoccupied 
with the genealogy of legal doctrine. Doctrinal legal history, and the use of the past by 
lawyers (who are, among other things, historians), attracted the suspicion of socio-legal 
scholars in that it underpinned and legitimated a preoccupation with the narrow technicalities 
of the law and the treatment of law as largely divorced from the society, politics, and 
economy in which it operated. Given the implicit hope that socio-legal scholarship would 
identify, and therefore bolster, movements that might ‘change society through law’, and that 
the past was replete with things that we should be leaving behind with the march of progress, 
the moral was clear: the less history the better. Hence, some ‘law in context’, and other legal 
scholarship, explicitly set their sights on the present, and against the 
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However, many socio-legal scholars embraced and were inspired by history, especially social 
history. They were energized by history’s reading of law as a social, political, and cultural 
formation that could only be understood over time; the contingency of particular legal 
arrangements; that ordinary people contributed by their conscious efforts to the making of 
history; and that law and legal practices were systematically structured by economic, cultural, 
and political power, thereby reinstating facets of the past that were otherwise marginalized. 
That E.P. Thompson, the doyen of social history and a lion of the political left, identified law 
as the locus of political contention2 was not without irony, as some of his comrades noted.3 
But it was music to the ears of critical and socio-legal scholars, and legal activists, justifying 
what they did. At ‘a practice level’, Thompson's message to his readers was ‘. . . Go to Law 
School’.4 
 
Deciphering the relationship between history and socio-legal studies necessitates addressing 
institutional factors and interests as well as ideas. The modern disciplines of law, history, and 
socio-legal studies were in important respects constituted against each other, and as separate 
from one another. They were competitors – for academic legitimacy, cultural authority, 
student numbers, and material support – making boundary maintenance part of their raison 
d’etre.5  
 
Academic historians harboured similar suspicions concerning law and legal history, adding 
further objections of their own. They stigmatized law and legal historians (with some notable 
exceptions) as intrinsically unhistorical, given their preoccupation with reading the past in the 
light of modern legal doctrine.6 Divorcing history from law and legal history spoke to the 
self-identity of modern professional historians.7 It was with pride that Geoffrey Elton, the 
foremost Tudor historian of his generation, proclaimed to his legal audience, ‘I am not a legal 
historian’.8 Belittling law and legal history was fair sport among historians. Hence Elton’s 
delicious quip: that the standard-bearer of English legal scholarship, the Law Quarterly 
Review, was ‘an austere journal in which incomprehensible problems so regularly receive 
incomprehensible solutions.’9 
 
                                            
1 R. Cocks, ‘History in Eclipse?’ in The Life of the Law, ed. P. Birks (1993) 257. 
2 E.P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters (1975) 258-269. 
3 P. Linebaugh, ‘From the Upper West Side to Wick Episcopi’ (1993) 201 New Left Rev. 18, at 23. 
4 id., p. 24. 
5 The existence of law faculties in England staffed by academics, and principally concerned with teaching the 
indigenous system, dates from c.1850 onwards. The scale of operations was small until the expansion of higher 
education after the Second World War, and especially from the mid-1960s onwards. The academic discipline of 
history is similarly of recent vintage, but, unlike law, it rapidly succeeded in attracting large student numbers 
and cultural capital. Although history remained important in law, and vice-versa, their interplay was rendered 
problematic by the drive to establish wholly independent academic subjects, specialization, professionalization, 
and a scientific model of intellectual work. 
6 The practices of historians are, of course, as presentist in their own ways as those of the legal community: P. 
Novik, That Noble Dream (1988). Moreover, lawyers played a significant role in creating modern historical 
method: J.G.A. Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law (1957); D.R. Kelley, Foundations of 
Modern Historical Scholarship (1970). 
7 An important exception is the history of medieval England, where law and legal sources have long been treated 
as central to the field. 
8 C. Holmes, ‘G.R. Elton as a Legal Historian’ (1997) 7 Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 267, at 
267. 
9 Holmes, id., p. 269. 
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Assorted professional lawyers and jurists tried to return history’s fire, branding the discipline 
of history ‘antiquarian’, ‘literary’, unable to explain the present, and reductive, reasserting the 
central (and beneficial) role of law and lawyers within the British polity.10  
 
While historians and socio-legal scholars recognize the utility of legal records, they have 
primarily been interested in their value as sources for social and cultural history, rather than 
the social history of law itself.11 Both socio-legal studies and history are disposed to the view 
that ‘the law’ itself is not a rewarding or worthwhile subject of investigation.12 The fog of the 
law, with its highly technical and arcane persona, is regarded with some justification as 
obscure and daunting. Hence, the social history of law itself has an image problem for history 
and socio-legal studies, further contributing to keeping ‘law’ and ‘legal history’ at arm’s 
length.  
 
Neither using history propelled primarily by the concerns and methods of social science, nor 
the appropriation of socio-legal scholarship by history, is straightforward. Socio-legal 
scholars tend to be less sceptical of ‘theory’ than historians, perhaps finding history’s 
preoccupation with the particular and detailed overwhelming, daunting or simply 
‘positivist’.13 Socio-legal scholars may treat history as largely a repository of examples and 
data that they can draw upon for their own purposes.14 But historians may regard this as 
ransacking secondary sources in order to ‘theorize the facts’, an exercise whose potential 
pitfalls include over-simplification. Yet there are important instances of successful 
borrowings and transplantation between history, legal history, and socio-legal studies. Indeed, 
there are long-standing traditions that both integrate history and law, and treat law as a social 
institution. Enlightenment jurists, for example, stressed that law was the product of time and 
historical development, and that it should be studied comparatively and, therefore, 
sociologically. In this way, the study of law and its history became a principal way of 
studying society – a perspective that was enthusiastically embraced by several leading social 
theorists, jurists, and historians of the pre-modern Western world.15  
 
In short, the relationship between history and socio-legal studies evinces both a striking 
overlap in concerns, methods, values and, indeed, history, and a common tradition. At their 
best, they both question received perspectives, have the power to contextualize, understand 
that effects often have multiple causes, and are able to challenge dominant myths. Yet these 
commonalities are frequently overlooked.16 To paraphrase Margot Finn, by confining their 
inquiries to separate channels, scholars of history and socio-legal studies too often navigate 
                                            
10 For example, A.V. Dicey, The Law of the Constitution (1885) at vi-vii, 12-19 - notwithstanding that Dicey 
made extensive use of history when it suited him. 
11 C.W. Brooks, Law, Politics and Society in Early Modern England (2008), 2. 
12 id. Compare D. Cowan and D. Wincott (eds.), Exploring the ‘Legal’ in Socio-Legal Studies (2016). 
13 Historians have expressed similar concerns about history: J. Guldi and D. Armitage, The History Manifesto 
(2015).  
14 M. Lobban, ‘Legal Theory and Legal History’ in Law in Theory and History, eds. M. Del Mar and M. Lobban 
(2016) 3. 
15 J.H. Franklin, Jean Bodin and the Revolution in the Methodology of Law and History (1963); Q. Skinner, The 
Foundations of Modern Political Thought (1978); D. Kelley, The Human Measure (1990). On the close 
interplay between law, history, and social theory in modern Anglo-American legal scholarship: D.M. Rabban, 
Law's History (2013); B.Z. Tamanaha, ‘The Third Pillar of Jurisprudence: Social Legal Theory’ (2015) 56 
William & Mary Law Rev. 2235. 
16 For incisive discussions of the relationship between law and history, see P.G. McHugh, ‘The Common-Law 
Status of Colonies and Aboriginal Rights’ (1998) 61 Saskatchewan Law Rev. 393; C. Tomlins, ‘Law and 
History’ in Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics, eds. R. D. Kelemen et al. (2008) 665; R.W. Gordon, Taming 
the Past (2017) chs. 10, 12, 13. 
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shared waters only to pass silently at a measured distance, like two ships in the night.17 At 
worst, historians and socio-legal scholars are in danger of developing theories and general 
conclusions based on overly restricted or misleading factual and methodological 
underpinnings.  
 
Since 1984, when I advocated a ‘more holistic and interdisciplinary’ history of English law, 
economy, and society, there has been an explosion of historical scholarship that has 
substantially extended and problematized our knowledge of the structure, function, 
development, and significance of legal discourse and legal practice in England and its empire 
in past times.18 Socio-legal scholars have made significant contributions to this 
metamorphosis and regularly take their inspiration from historically-informed work. And yet, 
at least in England, history is still not as fully integrated within socio-legal studies as it is in, 
say, Canada and the United States. In so far as it is historically-informed, socio-legal writing 
has long focused on the period since the eighteenth century, concentrating primarily on crime 
and the criminal justice system, the subject of some of the best British socio-legal history.19 
Consequently, important history writing on other topics and on law and society in medieval 
and early modern England, is either unknown to, or under-appreciated by, the socio-legal 
community. This limited engagement is not one-sided. While historians increasing resort to 
legal records and engage in law-related research, socio-legal scholarship is usually off their 
radars. 
 
This article argues that the work of both socio-legal scholars and historians would benefit 
from greater cross-fertilization, and from taking the social history of law itself more 
seriously.20 As an illustrative case study, I focus on the ‘legal turn’ in recent history writing 
on early modern England,21 particularly, its ground-breaking analysis of the nature and extent 
of legal consciousness throughout society, and the central role of law, the civil justice system, 
litigation, and lawyers in the constitution of society.  
 
The ‘legal turn’ in early modern English historiography elucidates how and why historians 
and socio-legal scholars have much to gain from deeper engagement with each other. At the 
centre of this legal turn is the historian, Christopher W. Brooks, who transcended the 
boundaries of social, political, and legal history, and placed law centre-stage. He 
demonstrated that law exercised a fundamental role in mediating and constituting social, 
political, and economic relationships at all levels of society throughout the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries. He investigated both elite and popular legal consciousness on an 
                                            
17 M. Finn, ‘Victorian Law, Literature and History’ (2002) 7 J. of Victorian Culture 134, at 135. 
18 D. Sugarman and G.R. Rubin, ‘Towards a new history of law and material society in England 1750-1914’ in 
Law, Economy and Society: Essays in the History of English Law 1750-1914, eds. G.R. Rubin and D. Sugarman 
(1984) 1. 
19 Notable exceptions include P. Goodrich, Languages of Law (1990); A. Hunt, Governance of the Consuming 
Passions (1995); M. Burrage, Revolution and the Making of the Contemporary Legal Profession (2006); the 
‘turn to history’ in constitutional and international law; significant elements within ‘law and literature’; and 
legal life writing. 
20 For a parallel endeavour, see C. Barzun and D. Priel, ‘Jurisprudence and (Its) History’ (2015) 101 Virginia 
Law Rev. 849. 
21 The early modern period roughly corresponds to the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. The 
mushrooming of interest in legal and allied sources has been characterized as 'the closest thing historians get to a 
gold rush': T. Stretton, 'Social historians and the records of litigation' in Fact, Fiction and Forensic Evidence ed. 
S. Songer (1997) 15 at 15. 
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almost unparalleled scale, adopting top-down and bottom-up approaches that revealed the 
trickle-up, as well as trickle-down, diffusion of legal ideas.  
 
Brooks engaged with many of the principal concerns of socio-legal studies. He challenged 
significant elements of the traditional narratives and taken-for-granted assumptions about the 
character of early modern and modern England and its law, suggesting that how we got from 
‘there’ to ‘here’ was less linear and progressive than is often assumed; and that what has 
frequently been surmised may be little more than musty cliché. His startling and counter-
intuitive conclusions include that: there was probably more litigation per head of population 
in England in 1600 than in the United States in 1990; the legal culture of sixteenth and 
seventeenth century England was more all-pervasive and inclusive, and access to justice was 
significantly greater then than subsequently; whilst modern historians of crime emphasized 
the central role of law in sustaining the hegemony of the powerful in eighteenth-century 
society, paradoxically perhaps, rates of litigation, resort to the law, and the importance of 
legal discourse all declined during the same period.  
 
In this article, I critically review Brooks’s principal ideas and findings, the contexts within 
which they arose, their theoretical underpinnings, and their larger significance.22 I hope to 
demonstrate that the legal turn in early modern English history is of fundamental interest to 
socio-legal studies. To this end, I also touch briefly on how historians might benefit from 
socio-legal scholarship. Although addressed primarily to socio-legal scholars, I hope it will 




Chris Brooks (1948-2014) was a United States-born historian who came of age in 1960s 
America, but spent much of his life in Britain, where he was a member of the Department of 
History at Durham University from 1980 until his death. His early life sensitized him to the 
omnipresence of law and lawyers in American society. As an undergraduate student at 
Princeton, inspired by his teacher, Lawrence Stone, he concentrated on the study of early 
modern England. Brooks would always remember Stone’s injunction that historians should 
address big questions and postulate bold ideas.  
 
Following Princeton, Brooks began postgraduate study at John Hopkins where, in his first 
PhD supervisor, Wilfrid Prest, he found a lifelong mentor, friend, and interlocutor. With 
Prest’s encouragement, Brooks transferred to Oxford, where his doctoral supervisor, J.P. 
Cooper, was another important formative influence, shaping Brooks’s conception of the 
vocation of the historian, with careful attention to archival sources, emphasis on precision 
and presenting the right evidence, erudition, and breadth of interests. Subsequently, as a 
Junior Research Fellow at Brasenose, Oxford, Brooks deepened his knowledge of early 
modern English history and became acquainted with some of the leading historians of 
English law. Moving to Durham in 1980, Brooks taught and supervised generations of 
students, and exercised, from the early 1990s onwards, an increasing influence on the writing 
of early modern English history. He was the foremost historian of law in early modern 
English society of the last half century.  
 
 
                                            
22 This essay focuses largely on Brooks’s principal books, rather than a comprehensive survey of all his 
publications. See, further, A. Green, ‘Christopher W. Brooks, 1948-2014’ (2014) 29 The Seventeenth Century 
403. 




Brooks’s scholarship should initially be read as a response to the distinctive historical and 
socio-legal currents of the 1970s and 1980s. At this time, the academic study of lawyers in 
history tended to:  
• be largely institutional, focusing on the establishment, organization, and evolution of 
professional infrastructure, rather than its social history; 
• conflate professionalization with the Industrial Revolution, and the ‘professional 
project’ of ‘market control’, generating a linear notion of professionalization, and 
monocausal explanations of the relationship between professions and society;23 
• frequently assume that few people came in contact with the law, save, on the one 
hand, the richest and most socially elevated, and, on the other, those unfortunate 
enough to be caught up with the criminal justice system, generally those on the 
bottom rungs of society. The social control functions of law were a central claim 
advanced by the first phase of the new social history of crime, criminal law, policing, 
and punishment, and much of this work adopted a two-class (patrician/plebeian) 
model of eighteenth-century society.24 Hence, civil law, lawyers, civil litigation, and 
the ‘middling sort’25 received limited attention. 
 
Several distinct but overlapping revisionist movements challenged these ideas: new histories 
of civil law and the professions, the turn to the ‘social’ in history, and histories of crime that 
treated law as more than the monopoly of the elite. These movements help situate Brooks’s 
initial work historically. 
 
First, the professions began to attract sustained historical interest, with some studies 
harnessing quantitative and qualitative research to illuminate the social, economic and 
intellectual history of professions.26 Second, E.P. Thompson emphasized that early modern 
society was not simply the product of the decisions of the elite, but involved an on-going 
process of negotiation in which a broad cross-section of the population participated.27 The 
partial autonomy of the rule of law rendered rulers at least occasionally ‘prisoners of their 
own rhetoric’.28 The law could sometimes be appropriated and used by the politically and 
economically dispossessed, as well as by the elite. Rather than mere superstructure, the law 
was imbricated within social and economic relations, and could be found at ‘every . . . level 
of society’.29 Thompson’s credo found immediate resonance in Brooks’s doctoral research on 
lawyers and litigation, sustaining his determination to address the culture of the rule of law.  
 
Third, Thompson also influenced those who advanced a modern history of civil law that 
transcended the dominant preoccupation with tracing genealogies of legal doctrine, instead 
treating law and legal institutions in their wider contexts. Hence, a collection of essays argued 
that civil law (such as contract, property, and family law) and lawyers were at least as 
important as the criminal law for understanding the place of law in mapping political, 
                                            
23 M.S. Larson, The Rise of Professionalism (1977). 
24 E.P. Thompson, ‘Patrician Society, Plebeian Culture (1974) 7 J. of Social History 382. 
25 ‘Middling sort’ includes apothecaries, artisans, small merchants, shopkeepers, doctors, surgeons, lawyers, 
clergy, tutors, and the military: see H.R.French, ‘The search for the “middle sort of people” in England, 1600-
1800’ (2000) 43 Historical J. 277. 
26 L. Stone, ‘The History of the Professions’ (1977) 11 J. of Social History 130; R.L. Kagan, Lawyers and 
Litigants in Castille, 1500-1700 (1980). 
27 Thompson, op. cit., n. 2, pp. 259-69; also, E.P.Thompson, Customs in Common (1993) at 97-351. 
28 id. (1975) at 264. 
29 E.P. Thompson, The Poverty of Theory (1978) at 288. 
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economic, social, and legal relationships in England during 1750-1914.30 The collection 
emphasized the plurality of law, ordering, and society; the complex and contradictory 
significance of law and lawyers as a source of ideas, ideologies, values, and instrumentalities; 
and ‘. . . cast doubt upon the dominant tradition of English legal historiography: evolutionism 




But Brooks was more than the embodiment of these diverse movements. He developed them 
in new and fruitful directions. Whilst most historians writing about early modern England 
acknowledged the importance of lawyers, there was little detailed research to support or 
amplify this conviction. Insofar as the history of England’s lawyers was scrutinized, it was 
largely preoccupied with the upper echelons, such as barristers and judges. In Pettyfoggers 
and Vipers of the Commonwealth,32 Brooks remedied this with regard to the so-called ‘lower 
branch’ of the legal profession – attorneys, solicitors, and minor legal officials – the largest 
group of legal practitioners of their day and the precursors of modern solicitors. He 
transcended the confines of institutional history by reconstructing both the professional and 
social history of the ‘lower branch’, who they were, their intellectual formation and culture, 
the services they provided, their interaction with their clients and their larger significance.  
 
The most significant development with which Brooks dealt was the dramatic growth in the 
amount of litigation that came before the courts during the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries. By 1550, the courts of Kings Bench and Common Pleas were hearing 
approximately six times more actions than at the end of the fifteenth century.33 The volume of 
litigation continued to grow – mostly fuelled by actions for debt – until well into the 
seventeenth century. Apparently, this was the most litigious period in English history. It is 
ascribed by Brooks to the relative cheapness of the central courts, substantially widening 
access to the courts and lawyers, and to a combination of social, economic, and demographic 
change, notably, more people and more prosperous times, rather than to a greater respect for 
law and order, or the wicked ways of lawyers. The vast majority (up to 70-80 per cent) of 
plaintiffs and defendants in the common law courts were neither very rich nor very poor. This 
explosion in litigation prompted the striking increase in the number of lawyers working in the 
central courts, multiplying much faster than the population growth over the period.34  
 
Underlying Brooks’s conclusions, which rested on years of painstakingly assembled data, 
was the kernel of a thesis that he advanced in greater detail in his subsequent work, and 
which almost immediately was taken up by other historians: namely, the causal importance of 
law, lawyers, and litigation – that they not only revealed much about the development of 




Brooks developed the insights and methodology of Pettyfoggers, and also addressed 
important new issues in fresh ways in subsequent publications. That he inspired others to 
                                            
30 Rubin and Sugarman, op. cit., n. 18. 
31 Sugarman and Rubin, op. cit., n. 18, p. 121. 
32 C.W. Brooks, Pettyfoggers and Vipers of the Commonwealth (1986). 
33 id., pp. 52-3. 
34 id., pp. 112-13. A similar ‘legal revolution’ has been discerned elsewhere in the Western world: see, for 
example, Kagan, op.cit., n. 26.  
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research early modern litigation, and that they largely confirmed his findings, was a source of 
encouragement to Brooks.35 He was now part of a larger community. In particular, he 
collaborated, both institutionally and intellectually, with the legal historian, Michael Lobban, 
a colleague at Durham during the mid-late 1990s, who remained important to Brooks.  
 
Although, like most historians, Brooks was not prone to detailed reflections on theory and 
method in print, he subsequently sketched his thoughts on these subjects.36 Here I focus on 
the ‘theory’ dimensions of his discussion, which singled out four works that shaped his 
perspective. One was Habermas’s study of the rise of middle class associational activities in 
the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, which Habermas argued created a new public 
sphere – a space of public discourse organized into a body under law independent of the state 
– subsequently diminished by capitalism.37  
 
Of the remaining works Brooks cited, one elevated culture as the primary determinant of 
historical reality,38 and the other two claimed that law was constitutive of society.39 The most 
important of these was Robert Gordon’s ‘Critical Legal Histories’,40 an influential essay on 
theory and method in legal history, that both deepened earlier critiques of legal 
functionalism41 and marshalled the case for taking law seriously. Gordon argued that ‘. . . it is 
just about impossible to describe any set of “basic” social practices without describing the 
legal relations among the people involved . . .’ and that law was ‘constitutive of 
consciousness’.42 In order to fully investigate the constitutive character of law, and to 
transcend the confines of those who focused exclusively on popular legal consciousness, 
Gordon advocated studying elite legal thought and thinkers, and their symbiotic relationship 
with other elite and popular discourses and actors, including lower-order officials, law 
makers, and practitioners.43 Law as ‘constitutive of consciousness’, the importance of legal 
doctrine, and the two-way relationship between mandarin legal thought and its vernacular 
forms, became significant elements in Brooks’s theoretical armour. Together with his turn to 
culture, it underpinned his move from a concern with legal ‘ideas’ shaping society, to legal 
‘discourse’ inscribing social, political, and economic relationships. He was also affected by, 
and contributed to, a growing body of work that emphasized the importance of the middling 
sort in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, highlighting the vital role that 
professions played in advancing the culture and interests of the middling sort.44  
 
                                            
35 H. Horwitz and P. Polden, ‘Continuity or change in the court of Chancery in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries?’ (1996) 35 J. of Brit. Studies 24; W.A. Champion, ‘Recourse to law and the meaning of the great 
litigation decline, 1650-1750’ in Communities and Courts in Britain 1150-1900, eds. C. Brooks and M. Lobban 
(1997) 179; C. Muldrew, The Economy of Obligation (1998). 
36 C. Brooks, Lawyers, Litigation and English Society since 1450 (1998) 179-98. 
37 J. Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1989). 
38 R. Chartier, Cultural History (1988). 
39 R.W. Gordon, ‘Critical Legal Histories’ (1984) 36 Stanford Law Rev. 57; S. Humphreys, ‘Law as Discourse’ 
(1985) 1 History and Anthropology 239. 
40 Brooks usually cited the most important authors first in his footnotes to Brooks, op. cit., n. 36. Gordon is the 
first named author in a list that is neither alphabetical nor chronological. The notion of law as ‘constitutive’ 
recurs in Brooks’s later work; Gordon’s thesis was quoted in Brooks, op. cit., n. 11, p. 5. 
41 The content of a legal rule is explained (causally) by the function the rule serves. 
42 Gordon has emphasized that the claim that law was constitutive was a hypothesis, and that law is partly, not 
wholly, constitutive: R.W. Gordon, ‘Critical Legal Histories Revisited’ (2012) 37 Law & Social Inquiry 200. 
43 Gordon, op. cit., n. 39, pp. 120-4. 
44 J. Barry and C.W. Brooks (eds.), The Middling Sort of People (1994). 
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The cornerstone of his next book, Lawyers, Litigation and English Society since 1450,45 was 
an innovative, if speculative, analysis of changes in court use in England over the eight 
centuries from 1200 to 1996, and their underpinning causes inspired, in part, by socio-legal 
scholarship.46 It confirmed that economic and demographic factors were more important than 
the legal profession or institutional innovation in the law. Again, the eruption of litigation 
during the period 1550-1640 was striking. Brooks estimated that the overall rate of litigation 
was twice as great per 100,000 of population in 1600 as in 1992.47  
 
In terms of numbers of lawyers, professional organization and education, the legal profession 
of the 1880s looked strikingly similar to that of the 1680s.48 Rather than exhibiting a linear 
progression over time, the legal profession experienced a significant period of de-
professionalization throughout the eighteenth century.49 The numbers of lawyers and amount 
of litigation markedly declined, and legal education, jurisprudence, and intellectual life 
atrophied. Brooks concluded that the dramatic decline in litigation was probably a 
consequence of reduced indebtedness, more flexible credit arrangements, and the ways courts 
and lawyers priced themselves out of the market.50  
 
Although the number of lawsuits and lawyers began to grow again in the nineteenth century, 
English litigation rates per capita continued to lag behind those of the United States and 
Germany during the twentieth century. The persistence of apprenticeship as the primary 
method of training for both branches of the profession in the wake of the inns’ decline 
inhibited plans for the introduction of more academic approaches to legal education, and the 
development of university law schools. Despite the advent of the cheaper system of dispute 
resolution associated with the creation of the new county courts, the liberalization of divorce 
law, and the introduction of state-funded legal aid after the Second World War, litigation 
became costlier and remained largely the preserve of the corporate world and the rich.51  
 
Brooks insisted that changing levels of litigation were important not in themselves but for 
what they might reveal about the changing character of society. He argued that the decline in 
litigation in the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries, relative to that in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries, denied broadly-based social groups access both to the law, and to 
social and political participation in civil society through the law, locally and nationally.52  
 
This set the stage for a series of provocative hypotheses that Brooks intended as suggestive 
rather than conclusive, and which he hoped would be refined by further research, namely, 
that:  
• The legal culture of early modern England was more inclusive and vibrant to a degree 
not seen since.  
• The post-1670 decline in litigation, the Inns of Court, the numbers of lawyers, and 
institutional legal education was particularly deleterious and coloured the subsequent 
                                            
45 Brooks, op. cit., n. 36. 
46 id., pp. 63-128, developing arguments originally advanced in Brooks’s most influential essay, 'Interpersonal 
conflict and social tension: civil litigation in England, I640-I830' in The First Modern Society, eds. A.L. Beier et 
al. (1989) 357.   
47 id., p. 79.  
48 id. (1998), pp. 68-72, 80-1, 104-15. 
49 id., p. 29. 
50 id., p. 91. 
51 id., p. 109. 
52 id., p. 119. 
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history of the English legal system and legal culture.53 Ordinary people became 
isolated from the legal system with professional lawyers and courts becoming more 
disconnected from society. Accordingly, ‘legal culture was arguably less significant in 
eighteen and nineteenth century England than it had been before 1700.’54 
• ‘Professionalisation’ as a characterization of the way the present differs from the past 
should be rejected.55 
•  ‘. . . [T]he civil law is even more important than the criminal law in maintaining the 
social and economic relationships in any society.’56 
 
Brooks emphasized the political role of law and lawyers in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, their prominence in the constitutional and political debates of the early seventeenth 
century, concluding that they probably figured more significantly and deeply in the political 
life of the nation then than in the period after 1700. He also developed his earlier arguments 
questioning the portrayal of the common law as monolithic, parochial, and unchanging – the 
language of the so-called ancient constitution.57 He demonstrated that the idea of the ancient 
constitution coexisted alongside other prominent discourses coloured by continental 
European humanism that provided a basis for legal change when human law did not conform 




In his final book, Law, Politics and Society in Early Modern England,59 Brooks examined the 
nature and extent of legal consciousness, and the inscription of law in politics and society, 
from the later middle ages until the outbreak of the English civil war. Its subject was the 
place occupied by, and the importance attached to, law – in particular, the amorphous culture 
of the rule of law – within the mental furniture of early modern English people as a whole. 
Brooks concluded that law permeated almost all levels of society, and, like religion, was a 
principal discourse through which the English understood their world; and that legal culture 
infused society to a degree probably not seen since. Indeed, he aimed to ‘. . . reintegrate the 
history of law, legal institutions and the legal professions within the general political and 
social history of the period . . .’.60 Brooks also set out to persuade early modern historians 
that they should take the social history of law itself more seriously, and showed how they 
might do so.  
 
In addition to the influences outlined previously, Brooks drew on recent historical scholarship 
concerning the ‘law-mindedness’ of the period, the cosmopolitanism of the common law 
mind, the prominence of legal thought within early modern political culture, and the inter-
play between legal, religious, and philosophical discourses. 61 Brooks’s growing interest in 
how legal processes fitted into the social and political life of communities and localities was 
sustained by the contribution of Keith Wrightson62 and his students, some of whom were 
                                            
53 id., pp. 109, 147, 150, 177-8. 
54 id., p. 109.  
55 id., p. 186. 
56 id., p. 28. 
57 C. Brooks and K. Sharpe, ‘History, English Law and the Renaissance’ (1976) 72 Past & Present 133. 
58 Brooks, op. cit., n. 36, p. 144. 
59 Brooks, op. cit., n. 11. 
60 id., p. 10.  
61 A. Cromartie, The Constitutionalist Revolution (2006). 
62 On whom, see S. Hindle, A. Shepard et al., ‘The Making and Remaking of Early Modern English Social 
History’ in Remaking English Society, eds. S. Hindle, A. Shepard et al. (2013) 1. 
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influenced by Brooks.63 Importantly, Brooks deepened his already considerable 
understanding of the legal system and law of the period, aided by the counsel and scholarship 
of J.H. Baker, the premier legal historian of early modern England.64 
 
Brooks delineated the constitutive and penetrative character of law throughout society by 
mapping the creation, transmission, and reception of legal thought. He emphasized that many 
gentry were educated at universities, the inns of courts, or both, that they undertook a 
growing number of legal duties, acting as justices of the peace, and the like, and regularly 
gave public talks on law, order, and community. This meant that they inevitably found 
themselves within the ambit of the quirks of the law, and the rhetoric of juristic humanism 
that came with them, including a circumscribed view of elite privilege, and a remarkably 
benign notion that the power of the elite should be harnessed in the service of the good of the 
community.65 This was but part of a distinctive, sophisticated culture of learning, teaching, 
debate, and discourse distinguishable from the custom-based popular culture of the law, one 
imbibed by lawyers, politicians, churchmen, landowners, merchants, and local and national 
officers, and one of many distinct but interconnected strands indicating the breadth and depth 
of ‘legal-mindedness’.66 
 
Brooks tracked lawyers’ views of law and jurisdiction from the lectures at the inns of court, 
law reports, and legal treatises to the private papers of government law officers, lawyers, and 
magistrates, and the off-the-peg material written by lawyers and plundered by the gentry for 
their speeches.67 He also charted how the revolution in printing – including the growing 
availability of printed legal materials, and the consumption of newspapers and magazines – 
contributed to the law’s penetration into society.68 
 
The transmission and diffusion of legal ideas, and the ‘social depth’ of legal knowledge, were 
further illuminated by incisive examinations of the interplay between law and religion, their 
evolution as part of contemporary debates on religion, economics, the constitution, and 
politics, the ways they competed with and borrowed from one another, and the permeation of 
the law in constitutional debates and political thought.69  
 
Brooks also drew on the many assize sermons, speeches (‘charges’) to juries at quarter 
sessions and assizes by judges or magistrates, and addresses to local courts by non-lawyer 
members of the landed gentry that communicated orally the content, procedures, and values 
of the law to the wider public.70 Although they ‘presented an idealised vision of justice that 
could border on propaganda’,71 these speeches will have made the ideas they eulogized 
familiar to ordinary people. To investigate law in the community, Brooks consulted court 
records at the local and regional level as well as those of the central jurisdictions in London, 
providing crucial evidence of face-to-face participation in, and experience of, the law.72  
 
                                            
63 This would include Craig Muldrew, Alexandra Shepard, and Tim Stretton. 
64 Brooks, op. cit., n. 11, p. viii. 
65 id., pp. 278-306.  
66 id., p. 17. 
67 id., pp. 294-306.  
68 id., pp. 68-75. 
69 id., p. 89. 
70 id., p. 161.  
71 T. Stretton, H-Albion (2009), at <http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=25362>.  
72 Brooks, op. cit., n. 11, pp. 87-114. 
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Brooks lavished particular attention on the thousands of local courts whose trials involved the 
presentation of oral testimony in a public forum and where decisions were made by jurors 
drawn broadly from the same locality as that in which the dispute occurred. The importance 
of these courts stemmed from their roles as mechanisms for dispute resolution and important 
administrative agencies. Brooks found that these local courts impacted on legal thinking in 
the central courts sustained by a legal world with ‘. . . an enduring tendency to privilege 
customary practices.’73  
 
Easy access to the courts – with their new remedies and procedures – was a source of 
individual agency and provided another basis for direct contact with the law. Local attorneys 
were readily available, with significant numbers not merely residing in rooms in urban inns, 
but actually owning alehouses.74 Moreover, most men, and many women, regularly used legal 
instruments to record the most important transactions in their lives.75  
 
Brooks showed how the law touched the lives of almost everyone as a consequence of the 
competing and sometimes contradictory multiplicity of legalities (English, Welsh, Scottish, 
and Irish), laws and regulations, ideas, courts (common law, equity, ecclesiastical, customary, 
and more) and legal personnel that together constituted ‘the law’, each with its own histories 
and distinctive niches.76  
 
Particularly interesting are the large number of relatively autonomous intermediate 
institutions such as guilds, towns, religious foundations, and corporate bodies – created, 
governed, and protected by the law – reflecting the multiplicity of venues and diversity of 
speakers now participating in public discourse. This takes us closer to understanding why law 
was so central in this period.  
 
The manifold ways in which legal ideas reflected social, economic, and political relations, 
mediated class relations, and were experienced personally by a large swathe of society were 
also surveyed: from relationships between the subject and the monarch, the individual and 
government, and landlords and tenants, to those between buyers and sellers, masters and 
servants, the person and the community, and between wives, husbands, and children. All 
were contested in courts, and discussed within the medium of legal thought.77  
 
One of the most striking features of the culture of the rule of law in the period was the way it 
provided the language of early modern ‘rights speak’ – giving space for words such as 
‘freedom’ and ‘liberty’ as well as notions of due process and equality before the law.78 Whilst 
Brooks recognized that status and wealth could influence justice, that the rights of the very 
poor were limited, and the gulf between the letter and ostensible aspirations of the law and 
their operation in practice could be great, he argued that the law was not simply an instrument 
by which the rulers controlled the ruled, but essentially the creature of the wider community. 
The institutions and processes of English law ‘made it subject to an ongoing process of 
negotiation participated in by a broad cross-section of the population.’79  
                                            
73 id., p. 425. 
74 C. Brooks, ‘Litigation, Participation, and Agency in Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century England’ in The 
British and their Laws in the Eighteenth Century, ed. D. Lemmings (2005) 158. 
75 Brooks, op. cit., n. 11, p. 308. 
76 id., p. 102. 
77 id., p. 7. 
78 id., p. 432. 
79 id., pp. 430-1. 
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The intellectual world of the law buttressed the rule of law and the independence of lawyers. 
The outwardly conservative, unchanging, and insular ‘common law mind’ was mediated by 
Continental European jurisprudence, classical literature (especially, Aristotle and Cicero), 
and a degree of humanist-inspired idealism. Most lawyers opposed those rulers, whose very 
being supposedly underpinned their legitimacy. Moreover, when the tensions between the 
monarch and parliament intensified in the seventeenth century, the culture of law-mindedness 
was sufficiently powerful that the opposing parties initially spoke the language of 
constitutional principles rather than naked self-interest or power politics. But the catastrophic 
breakdown of relations that heralded the English Civil War was a powerful reminder of the 
limits of legal thought. Brooks speculated that this huge trauma for both law and society may 





Always careful and rigorous, Brooks acknowledged the methodological and interpretative 
pitfalls involved in piecing together court usage and law-mindedness. Although he conveyed 
a strong sense of the complex reasons for the phenomena he investigated, the sweep and 
ambition of his scholarship renders it more vulnerable to criticism.80  
 
Grounds for statistical quibbling are inevitable given that the extent of the court records 
necessitated sampling by selected years, and the twisted and skewed nature of some of the 
evidence.81 Prest has alluded to a related problem: 
Legal actions, then as now, were far from created equal in terms of length and 
procedural complexity, let alone quantity and quality of the parties involved and their 
lawyers. So, it is no simple matter to read off social or professional meaning from 
observed changes in the raw frequency of litigation, especially since these fluctuations 
may well reflect alterations in judicial procedure . . . as well as or indeed rather than 
events occurring in the world outside the court room.82  
 
The decline in litigation discerned by Brooks is perhaps best seen as a return to normal levels 
of litigation.83 Whether his claim that law and lawyers were less important after c.1700, than 
in the period c. 1560-1700, has much veracity is difficult to access in any general sense. It 
will require much more research, and is likely to elicit a complex response.  
 
Some may be sceptical of Brooks’s claims about the range and depth of law consciousness.84 
Apparent use and conformity with the law may obscure non-conformity and a lack of 
legitimacy.85  
                                            
80 Brooks subtly developed and stoutly defended several of his core arguments in two important late essays: 
most notably, Brooks, op. cit., n. 74; and also, C.W. Brooks, ‘The Longitudinal Study of Civil Litigation in 
England 1200-1996’ in Litigation, eds. W. Prest and S.R. Anleu (2004) 24.  
81 W. Prest, ‘The Experience of Litigation in Eighteenth-Century England’ in Lemmings, op. cit., n. 74, p. 133. 
82 W. Prest, ‘Law Tricks’ (2005) 39 J. of Brit. Studies 372, at 375; also S.R. Anleu and W. Prest, ‘Litigation’ in 
Prest and Anleu (eds.), op. cit., n. 80, p. 1. 
83 C. Muldrew, ‘From a “Light Cloak” to an Iron Cage’ in Communities in Early Modern England, eds. A. 
Shepard and P. Witherington (2000) 156. 
84 R.W. Hoyle, ‘Review of Law, Politics and Society in Early Modern England by Christopher W. Brooks’ 
(2011) 59 Agricultural History Rev. 132, at 133. 
85 However, individuals’ legal consciousness may be framed by ideas about law even when they are actively 
resisting it. 
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Brooks was, perhaps, over-generous in his treatment of the lower branch and of legal services 
and too dismissive of contemporary criticisms of attorneys, the inequities of the legal system, 
the adequacy of the inns of courts’ provision for professional regulation and education, and 
persistent demands for law reform.86 He was probably reacting to easy acceptance by 
historians of contemporary complaints about the law and lawyers.  
 
More generally, Brooks’s depiction of early modern England, particularly, its law and legal 
system, is sometimes overly-rosy. He often reaches conclusions that emphasize consensus, 
agency, the role of the law in disciplining elite and state power, and as a defence against 
repression; and minimizes conflict, coercion, domination, structural inequality, acquiescence, 
inaction, and law’s role in the legitimation of power.87 Participation, negotiation and going to 
court are not necessarily empowering, and their equation with power is likely to mislead.  
 
It is also unclear what ‘one of the most striking features of the rule of law’ – ‘a language of 
liberty’88 – means in the context of the ‘integration’ of Wales89 and the use of English law 
and legal institutions as ‘. . . instruments of social engineering . . .’ and ‘. . . cultural 
imperialism . . .’ in Ireland.90 And, as Rabin noted: 
Despite the expansion of English dominion into surrounding regions and the 
recurrence of the word ‘empire’ in his sources, Brooks does not consider a full-
fledged analysis of what empire meant to early modern English society and how the 
legal framework . . . enabled empire to emerge as a project for early modern 
contemporaries.91 
 
If, as Brooks discerned, law and society were hopelessly tangled up, disentangling this 
befuddling cacophony, and mustering sufficient evidence to elevate law as the prime 
determinant may prove an intractable problem of historical explanation. Brooks did not tackle 
head-on what made ‘law mindedness’ ‘legal’, as distinct from something else.92 Was, for 
example, a promise to perform a contract or to marry ‘legal’, ‘religious’, ‘moral’, ‘political’, 
‘economic’ or ‘emotional’ – all of which may have been partly framed in legal terms – or 




None of this is to deny the power, nuance, and significance of Brooks’s scholarship. The 
relationship between the legal ideas discussed in Parliament, or famous state trials, and the 
everyday legal life of the mass of the population, for example, was recognized as 
problematic.93 Neither the extensive use of law courts, nor simply knowing the law, in 
                                            
86 Prest, op. cit., n. 81; W.R. Prest, ‘Law Reform in Eighteenth-Century England’ in The Life of the Law, ed. P. 
Birks (1993) 117; P. Raffield, ‘A Discredited Priesthood’ (2005) 17 Law and Literature 365. 
87 On  agency, participation, negotiation  and the law, see: S. Hindle, The State and Social Change in Early 
Modern England (2000); M. Braddick and J. Walter (eds.), Negotiating Power in Early Modern Society (2001).  
Brooks’s treatment of the period contrasts with those historians who emphasise a polarity between the mass of 
the population and the elites: for example, A. Wood, The Politics of Social Conflict (1999). 
88 Brooks, op. cit., n. 11, p. 423. 
89 id., pp. 125, 425. 
90 id., p. 129. 
91 D. Rabin, ‘Christopher W. Brooks. Law, Politics and Society in Early Modern England’ (2010) 115 Am. 
Historical Rev. 604, at 605. 
92 H. Hartog, ‘Introduction to Symposium on Critical Legal Histories’ (2012) 37 Law & Social Inquiry 147, at 
153; S.L. Blumenthal, ‘Of Mandarins, Legal Consciousness and the Cultural Turn in US Legal History’ (2012) 
37 Law & Social Inquiry 167, at 178. 
93 Brooks, op. cit., n. 11, pp. 9-10. 
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themselves proved that the rule of law was accepted as a cultural value by the poorest as well 
as the richest. Rather, Brooks acknowledged that ‘it is not easy to measure the practical 
impact of’ law’.94 And while emphasizing the degree of consensus across society concerning 
the idea of the rule of law, he also highlighted the conflicts over its practical import, the 
indeterminacy of legal principles, the ‘many different voices’ contained within legal 
discourse and constitutional thought, and the tensions between the ecclesiastical and secular 
courts in the aftermath of the reformation. Widespread ‘legal-mindedness’ among many 
social groups did not mean that its outcomes were always predictable.  
 
Brooks was clear that his was the first, not the last, word on the subject. While his larger 
conclusions may be contested, it is hard to see how his emphasis on the centrality of law to so 
many aspects of early modern England will ever be overturned. 
 
Brooks’s importance derives, in part, from the way he serves as a vital bridgehead between 
legal, social, and political history. From the 1970s onwards, John Baker transformed the 
history of law and legal institutions in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.95 But social and 
political historians were slow to discern the extent to which Baker’s scholarship challenged 
the historical canon of the period. Brooks was alone among social historians to fully 
appreciate Baker’s significance and to come to terms with it. For Brooks, law provided the 
vehicle for transcending the divide between political, social, and legal history.96 He 
demonstrated that law had social, political, and legal dimensions of considerable significance, 
and that legal, social, and political historians had largely neglected those dimensions and, 
crucially, their interaction. This, in turn, required taking the ‘legal’, as well as the ‘socio’, 
seriously. Brooks was persuaded that ‘. . . we can understand the social significance of the 
doctrines expounded by judges [and lawyers] only by resolutely entering the muddy waters of 
the law itself and emerging on the other side, and not by skirting round them.’97  
 
In many respects, Brooks’s work: 
. . . defines a new historical space in the gaps between the history of ideas, political 
thought, legal practice, and economic and social history . . . [It] has implications that 
stretch far beyond the realm of legal history, because it demonstrates that legal 
principles and discourse evolve not in a vacuum, or at the will of economic trends, but 






This section draws on the ‘legal turn’ in the history of early modern England to outline some 
areas of common interest to historians, socio-legal scholars, and legal historians. As a totality, 
this turn to law constitutes a new history of English law, governance, and society, a history 
that addresses (amongst other things) the social characteristics and purposes of litigants; 
popular experience, perceptions, and knowledge of the law; public participation in, and 
                                            
94 id., p. 61. See, also, pp. 241, 383, 426, 432. 
95 The Reports of Sir John Spelman 2 vols., ed. J.H. Baker (1977-8); J.H. Baker, The Oxford History of the Laws 
of England Volume Vi - 1483-1558 (2003). 
96 Brooks, op. cit., n. 11, p. 10. 
97 K.W. Wedderburn, The Worker and the Law (1971) 8-9. 
98 H.R. French, ‘Law, politics, and society in early modern England – By Christopher W. Brooks’ (2010) 63 
Economic History Rev. 237, at 238. 
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access to, legal institutions; the growth of legislation and its impact on society; law and 
empire; crime, law, literature, and allied media (such as the popular press) and society; law 
and the constitution of gender and national identity; and the role of emotions on the 
behaviour of legal actors and the development of law. It enlarges the field both in terms of 
subject-matter and methodologies, and also the range of sources utilized, potentially, 
providing a deeper understanding of the workings of the law and its wider importance.99  
 
The interplay between law, agency, social hierarchy, and gender has become an important 
and exciting field within early modern English history, advancing our understanding of how 
the law constituted and policed patriarchy, how women attenuated and circumvented 
coverture100 using the law and lawyers, the high proportion of female litigants in certain 
fields, the kinds of disputes in which they were involved, and a comparison of the 
presentational styles of male and female litigants. More generally, it illuminates gender as a 
source of identity and as a structuring force in social relations.101  
 
Academic lawyers, legal historians, and socio-legal scholars will find much food for thought 
in Muldrew’s richly-textured and challenging work. Muldrew suggests that early modern 
England was more market-orientated, and more dependent upon credit, reputation, trust, and 
community in the settlement of economic disputes than previously suspected.102 Muldrew 
criticizes Weber for discerning a ‘spirit of capitalism’ in the actions and beliefs of market-
orientated individuals: ‘What mattered was not an internalized or autonomous self, but the 
public perception of the self in relation to a communicated set of both personal and household 
virtues.’103 According to Muldrew, the infusion of the idea of the ‘equality’ of the law into so 
many social exchanges gradually led to the expansion of contractual thinking emphasizing 
sociability, individual agency, and equality of rights, which had a significant effect on social 
relations. He argues that, during the eighteenth century, we see a retreat from the ideal of 
trust, and its displacement by a utilitarian ethic that valued self-interest and personal 
happiness above community.104 The expansion of contractual thinking continued, including 
the rise of ‘freedom of contract’, in the nineteenth century.105 Muldrew subtly excavates how 
lawyers and litigation helped to constitute and re-fashion social relations.  Like other notable 
work on the period, his analysis involves interpretations of literary works, economic and 
                                            
99 The relevant literature is sizeable; hence, the sources cited below are indicative. For an instructive overview, 
see D. Lemmings, ‘Introduction’ in The British and their Laws in the Eighteenth Century, ed. D. Lemmings 
(2005) 1. See, further, R. Houston, ‘Custom in Context’ (2011) 211 Past & Present 35 and ‘People, Space and 
Law in Late Medieval and Early Modern Britain and Ireland’ (2016) 230 Past & Present 47, and the historical 
scholarship to which they refer; (2017) 38(2) J. of Legal History (special issue on law and emotion); C. 
Churches, ‘Going to Law in Early-Modern England’ in Prest and Anleu, eds., op. cit., n. 80, p. 44 (on the 
experience of going to law, the out-of-court tactics of the parties, why the dispute ended in court, rather than 
other fora, the impact of a lawsuit on the larger community, and how ordinary people gained knowledge of the 
law). 
100 The legal doctrine whereby, upon marriage, a woman's legal rights and obligations were subsumed into those 
of her husband. 
101 For example, L. Gowing, Domestic Dangers (1996); T. Stretton, Women Waging Law in Elizabethan 
England (1998); G. Walker, Crime, Gender and Social Order in Early Modern England (2003); T. Stretton and 
K. Kesselring, Married Women and the Law (2013); A. Shepard, Accounting for Oneself: Worth, Status and the 
Social Order in Early Modern England (2015). 
102 Muldrew, op. cit., n. 35.   
103 id., p. 156. 
104 id., pp. 328-31. 
105 C. Muldrew, ‘Trust, Capitalism and Contract in English Economic History: 1550-1750’ (2015) 36 Social 
Sciences in China 130. This echoes some of the arguments in P.S. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of 
Contract (1979).  
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social commentaries, legal texts and law cases, and archivally-based studies of economic 
practices and litigation.106 
 
While Brooks emphasized the importance of civil litigation, attention to the interface and 
interplay between the civil and criminal justice system could prove fruitful. Definitions of 
‘civil’ and ‘criminal’ changed over time, and were frequently blurred in theory and practice. 
As Brooks acknowledged, the decline in civil litigation and the rise of the ‘adversarial 
criminal trial’ were related, ‘. . . and both were central to the watershed that separates the 
medieval and early modern English legal system from that which evolved from the mid-
eighteenth century onwards.’107 What, exactly, evolved from the eighteenth century to the 
present, and its larger significance, is the subject of extensive historical writing.108 Building 
upon that scholarship, Lemmings argues that during the period 1680-1800, governance was 
shifting from ‘consent’ to ‘command’ with declining popular participation, the rise of 
professional administration through the application of statutory powers, as opposed to the 
common law.109 He claims that the modernization of government entailed moving away from 
a ‘big society’ culture towards a more professionalized and mediated experience of power 
which depended on the management of public opinion, parliamentary absolutism, and a 
‘bourgeois’ suspicion of active popular involvement in law and government. This thesis 
resonates with socio-legal scholarship that has melded law, legal theory, history, and social 
theory to address similar issues. It is not, for the most part, ‘historical scholarship, but . . . 
draws on historical research to drive its interpretive project.’110 And like historical research, it 
is centrally concerned with the expanded scope afforded to lawyers in courts 
(‘lawyerization’); criminalization; professionalization; the systematization of law and other 
‘knowledges’; the decline in the participation of ordinary people in open court; governance 
and the growth in state power; the rise and fall of democratic citizenship; and the nature of 
modern society itself.111 
 
The disquiet that Brooks expressed about the decline in the number of trials, and the 
increasing isolation of ordinary people from the legal system, is confirmed in the rich socio-
legal literature on the ‘vanishing trial’ and its adverse effects as adjudication is diffused, 
                                            
106 Muldrew, op. cit., n. 35. 
107 Brooks, op. cit., n. 74, p. 181. 
108 J.M. Beattie, ‘Scales of Justice’ (1991) 9 Law and History Rev. 221; D. Hay, ‘Master and Servant in 
England’ in Private Law and Social Inequality in the Industrial Age, ed. W. Steinmetz (2000); P. King, Crime, 
Justice, and Discretion in England 1740-1820 (2000); J. Langbein, The Origins of the Adversary Criminal Trial 
(2003); A.N. May, The Bar and the Old Bailey, 1750–1850 (2006); P. King, Crime and Law in England, 1750–
1840 (2006). 
109 D. Lemmings, Law and Government in England during the Long Eighteenth Century (2015). 
110 N. Lacey, In Search of Criminal Responsibility (2016) 12. 
111 The relevant historical and socio-legal literature includes Atiyah, op. cit., n. 105; R. Cocks, Foundations of 
the Modern Bar (1983); D. Garland, Punishment and Welfare (1985); D. Sugarman, ‘Bourgeois Collectivism, 
Professional Power and the Boundaries of the State’ (1996) 3 International J. of the Legal Profession 81; D. 
Sugarman, ‘Legal theory, the common law mind and the making of the textbook tradition’ in Legal Theory and 
Common Law, ed. W. Twining (1986) 26; M.J. Wiener, Reconstructing the Criminal (1990); J. Vernon, Politics 
and the People (1993); L. Farmer, Criminal Law, Tradition and Legal Order (1997); L. Farmer, Making the 
Modern Criminal Law (2016); D.J.A. Cairns, Advocacy and the Making of the English Criminal Trial 1800-
1865 (1998); D. Lemmings, Professors of the Law (2000); J.-M. Schramm, Testimony and Advocacy in 
Victorian Law, Literature, and Theology (2000); J. Simon, Governing Through Crime (2007); A. Fernandez and 
M. D. Dubber (eds.), Law Books in Action (2012); Lacey, id; D. Lemmings (ed.), Crime, Courtrooms and the 
Public Sphere in Britain, 1700-1850 (2012); A. Norrie, Crime, Reason, History (2014); W.W. Pue, Lawyers’ 
Empire (2016).  See, also, the material in n.108 and n. 109.  
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privatized, and largely unregulated.112 This, and allied scholarship, is timely, given current 
cut-backs in state-funded legal aid, the erection of other barriers to access to justice by 
citizens, and the efforts of governments and insurance companies to persuade us of our 
‘spiralling . . . compensation culture’.113 It challenges assumptions that high levels of 
litigation were undesirable, that it was symptomatic of a ‘fractured society’, and that lawyers 
were its only beneficiaries. Rather, it suggests that communities can be litigious as well as 
harmonious.  
 
Brooks stressed the important role played by the transmission and appropriation of foreign 
ideas, but did not examine it in the context of British colonialism. Of particular interest is 
whether the legalism of seventeenth-century English culture, and its predilection for creating 
rule-bound, semi-autonomous communities, shaped colonial and post-colonial America and 
other British colonies.114 In sum, Brooks’s findings and methods warrant further exposure 
from a comparative, colonial/postcolonial, transnational, and global perspective. 
 
Since the 1990s, both historical and socio-legal scholarship on legal consciousness have 
produced detailed accounts of how law was interwoven with, and has helped to structure, the 
routine practices of social life. But they have differences which suggest that speaking to each 
other might not be straightforward. They frequently differ on what, precisely, they mean by 
‘legal consciousness’. ‘Law mindedness’ – a term sometimes used by historians – suggests a 
narrower idea than ‘legal consciousness’. Socio-legal research has benefitted from extensive 
sets of interview data unavailable to early modernists. Historians, chiefly those concerned 
with the civil law and civil litigation, have tended to neglect issues of legal hegemony, 
especially, how the law maintains its institutional power despite a recurrent gulf between the 
letter and ideology of the law, and the law in action – whereas this has been an important vein 
within socio-legal scholarship. How might this concern with, for example, legal hegemony, 
Ehrlich’s concept of ‘living law’, or Ewick and Silbey’s taxonomy of before/with/against the 
law, be salient to historians interested in the centrality (or not) of formal legal norms on how 
people order their everyday lives?115 That there is common ground is suggested by the fact 
that historians and socio-legal scholars are increasingly exploring the political, professional 
and, above all, popular dimensions of legal consciousness.116 And they are doing so by 
investigating the dissemination, reception and re-constitution of legal ideas and the depiction 
of legal actors and institutions in non-traditional spheres (public spaces beyond the 
courtroom, magazines, newspapers and other manifestations of the ‘print revolution’, 
literature, the theatre, portraits, cartoons and other visual images). The close association 
between court performance (especially counsel for the accused) and stage performance has 
been considered by a number of researchers. Legal consciousness traverses intellectual, 
                                            
112 M. Galanter, ‘The Vanishing Trial’ (2004) 1 J. of Empirical Legal Studies 459; J. Resnik and D.E. Curtis, 
Representing Justice (2011); H. Genn, ‘Why the Privatisation of Civil Justice is a Rule of Law Issue’ (2012) 
36th F.A. Mann Lecture. 
113 A. Morris, ‘The “Compensation Culture” and the Politics of Tort’ in Tort Law and the Legislature, eds. T.T. 
Arvind and J. Steele (2013) 57. 
114 M.S. Bilder, The Transatlantic Constitution (2004); L. Benton and R.J. Ross (eds.), Legal Pluralism and 
Empires, 1500-1850 (2013).   
115 P. Ewick and S. Silbey, The Common Place of Law (1998); S.E. Merry, Legal Consciousness Among 
Working Class Americans (1990); M. Hertogh, ‘A “European” conception of legal consciousness: rediscovering 
Eugen Ehrlich’ (2004) 31 J. of Law and Society 455. I am indebted to Sally Sheldon for challenging me on this 
topic. 
116 For example, S. Wilf, Law’s Imagined Republic (2010); Lemmings, op. cit. (2012), n. 111. On the 
relationship between law, literature, the arts, and drama: E. Sheen and L. Hutson (eds.), Literature, Politics and 
Law in Renaissance England (2005); S. Mukherji, Law and Representation in Early Modern Drama (2006); J.E. 
Archer et al. (eds.), The Intellectual and Cultural World of the Early Modern Inns of Court (2011).  
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social, cultural and legal history, and socio-legal studies, in new and exciting ways, posing 






An increasing number of socio-legal and contextualist histories of law in England are to be 
found in the legal history lists of publishers, and in legal history periodicals. This reflects an 
important but largely unnoticed change in the character of English legal history: namely, its 
growing recognition that while legal doctrine is important, so too is the real impact of law on 
society.117 The increasing convergence between legal history on the one hand, and history 
and socio-legal studies on the other, has further opened up the possibility of greater dialogue 
between them. But making that dialogue happen will require better institutional support, and 
changes in the cultures and mind-sets of history, socio-legal studies, and legal history, and 
greater self-reflexivity. It will also generate difficult questions and controversy as to what sort 
of rapport might be appropriate, when, how and to what effect? I nonetheless hope that I have 
substantiated the proposition that greater dialogue between history, socio-legal studies, and 
legal history would broaden and deepen our understanding of the role that law plays in 
society, and of society itself, and would be of more than mere historical interest. 
 
                                            
117 Compare J. Rose, ‘English Legal History and Interdisciplinary Legal Studies’ in Boundaries of the Law, ed. 
A. Musson (2004) 169. 
